The Prisoner's Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and physical sciences. In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the 2-dmensional payoff space in an infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game, based on Markov chain analysis with memory-one strategies. We generalize this approach and introduce the concept of strategy parameter to show that linear relations among player payoffs are a ubiquitous feature of the infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. Our extended analysis is applied to various strategy profiles including tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift, and other randomized strategy sets. Strategy profiles are identified that map onto the vertices, edges, and interior of the Prisoner's Dilemma quadrilateral in the twodimensional payoff (score) space. A DaMD strategy is defined based solely on "Defection after Mutual Defection" and leads to linear relations between player scores using strategy parameter analysis. The DaMD strategy is shown to result in an equal (reciprocal) or larger (extortive) score for its user compared to the other player, independent of the strategy set of the other player. The extortive scores occur when the probabilities for the DaMD player to cooperate after conflicting plays (cooperate-defect or defect-cooperate) sum to less than 1. The equal reciprocal scores occur when the probabilities for the DaMD player to cooperate after conflicting plays (cooperate-defect or defect-cooperate) sum to 1. When one player selects the extortive DaMD, the opposing player can force the equal punishment payoffs for both players in the infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma by also choosing the DaMD strategy. Possible pathways to mutual cooperation based on DaMD are discussed.
Introduction
Prisoner's Dilemma is a time-honored paradigm for 2X2 games that are used for understanding of complex problems in the social, behavioral, biological, and physical sciences [1, 2, 3, 4] . Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) was developed in 1950 at RAND by Flood and Dresher [2] . Axelrod describes many of the strategies used to solve the iterated PD and reports on "tournaments" to test various strategies developed by himself and many others [3] . These tournaments have continued in one form or another [5] . Nowak has authored an accessible book which treats the iterated PD as well as other classic iterated games focusing on evolutionary dynamics [6] . Recently, Lambert, Vyawahare, and Austin have applied a game theory approach to the physics of bacteria growth and, potentially, cancer propagation [7] . The scope and long history of game theory, Prisoner's Dilemma, and applications makes it surprising that a novel analytic technique for infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) was discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 [8] . At its core, this method of analysis provides tools for understanding the mapping of the 8-dimensional hypercube of strategy profiles of IPD onto the 2-dimensional space of payoffs for the 2 players. This discovery led to a resurgence of interest and new applications of the Prisoner's Dilemma, mostly in evolutionary dynamics [9, 10, 11, 12] . The zero-determinant strategy (ZDS) assumes a player always defects after mutual defection along with other conditions on the player's actions [8] . ZDS was shown to result in a linear relationship between scores of the players. A ZDS that received a higher score than a fully cooperative opponent was called extortionate.
We develop a general analytic technique using the concept of strategy parameter. We identify strategy sets that lead to vertex scores of the PD stage game and strategy sets that map onto the edges of the stage game. These edge strategy sets correspond to players who fully defect or fully cooperate independent of the strategy set of the other player. We show, using a strategy parameter analysis, that linear relations between player scores are a ubiquitous feature of the infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma for many well-known strategy sets. Strategy sets include tit-for-tat (TFT), win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS), randomized versions of TFT and WSLS, and a randomized strategy set called the -strategy set which is an extended version of Axelrod's RANDOM strategy set [3, 5, 6, 9, 11] . TFT and WSLS also play vs an opponent using an arbitrary strategy. The initial Axelrod tournaments for IPD were won by TFT [3] . Nowak now calls WSLS "currently 'world champion'" of play for the IPD [6] . The linear relations generated using our strategy parameter analysis give theoretical underpinnings for these computer tournament results.
Based on strategy parameter analysis, we define a general strategy set (DaMD, "Defection after Mutual Defection") that subsumes the ZDS and that can generate a score for its user that is larger than or equal to the score of the other player. We call these two classes of DaMDextortive and reciprocal. This score ordering is independent of the opponent strategy unless the opponent also uses DaMD. We show that other strategies besides DaMD and ZDS can also result in the same type of behavior of scores, but with an important difference. WSLS is a particularly surprising strategy set in that it has extortive and reciprocal score ordering, but the outcomes are decided by the play of the opponent. Mutual DaMD strategies, leading to a string of mutual defection, are the equilibrium strategy profile for two rational players in an infinitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. This is the same result as the equilibrium mutual defection strategy profile for the single-play and finitely iterated Prisoner's Dilemma games. The DaMD, however, describes a possible pathway to cooperation and enhanced scores for both players, including rational and naïve players. The result can be stable scores greater than those of mutual defection for both players.
II. Prisoner's Dilemma Stage Game
The focus here is the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game. The IPD is based on the static, stage game that is described in terms of a 2X2 matrix with ordered pair elements. This matrix captures both the strategies and the payoffs of the players in the stage game [13, 14] . Fig. 1 gives a standard form of the matrix. See text for discussion.
In Fig. 1 , the two players are labeled X and Y. Decisions or actions for the individual players are labeled by c (cooperate) and d (defect). The ordered pairs in the four quadrants enclosed by brackets are payoffs of the two players. The first entry of the ordered pair corresponds to the payoff for player X, the second entry to the payoff for player Y. The analysis here is not restricted to having the payoffs for X and Y the same, but we shall assume this condition resulting in a symmetric stage game. So ' RR = , etc. If both players cooperate, the payoff is R (reward) to each. If both player defect, the payoff is P (punishment) to each. If one player cooperates and the other player defects, then the player that cooperates gets payoff S (sucker) and the player that defects get payoff T (temptation). The classic PD stage game puts two conditions on the four payoffs: T R P S  and, less crucial to PD, 2R T S +. The first condition ensures that mutual defection with payoff ( ) , PP is a Nash equilibrium strategy [13, 14, 15] . The second condition ensures that mutual cooperation with payoff ( ) , RR is the best mutual outcome of the four ordered pairs, a Pareto optimal payoff for both players [13, 14] . There are no other conditions on the payoffs for the PD except that usually the probabilities and payoffs employed are drawn from rational numbers. Axelrod emphasizes the payoff set ( ) ( ) , , , 5,3,1,0 T R P S = which satisfies the condition 2 > + [3] . The general analysis below does not depend on the specific values of the payoff set. In all numerical examples, we use the traditional Axelrod payoffs although general results are valid for any payoff set that satisfies the two conditions above. The matrix in Fig. 1 includes both player payoffs (ordered pairs) and player actions (c or d). Game theory uses terms with social, behavioral, or economic connotations so such terms (game, player, payoff, strategy, cooperate, defect, decision, etc.) are encountered in various sections but are concentrated in Section IX. Conclusions.
The payoff sets for the static stage game are frequently depicted on a 2-dimensional plane in which the payoffs of the two players are denoted by , , , or For a static stage game with single play and synchronous actions for X and Y, only the four vertices shown as solid circular points in Fig. 2 are valid payoffs. However, it has been realized even from the original work of von Neumann and Nash, that some form of repeated game was necessary for game theory to be relevant to real conflicts. This realization in turn leads to the payoff sets within the quadrilateral enclosed by the dashed lines including the boundary as being valid payoffs for the IPD. The characterization of the strategy profiles for both players leading to these more general payoff points (SX,SY) is addressed below. In preparation for this analysis, the equations for the straight lines forming the four edges of the quadrilateral in Fig. 2 
ii) Edge II:
iii) Edge III:
iv) Edge IV:
At this point, the linear relations in Eq. 1 are only algebraic formulas for the dashed lines joining the four vertices in Fig. 2 . Below we show that the four edges have meaning for the IPD in terms of mapping of specific strategy profiles.
III. Generalized Analysis of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
The iterated Prisoner's Dilemma involves infinitely repeated play of the PD stage game and synchronous actions of players X and Y. The assumptions of the IPD result in transition probability matrices for player actions that are Markov with row entries adding to unity. The theory of infinite Markov chains is the fundamental theory for IPD [16, 17] . We review the essential concepts of the Markov chain approach with memory-one strategies to the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [8] . The 4-vector (  )   1  2  3  4 , , , p p p p = p is the strategy set of player X. i p are conditional transition probabilities for player X to cooperate in the current round of the stage game, and 01 i p  . The 4-vector ( )
, , ,p p = q is the strategy set of Y. i q are also conditional transition probabilities for Y to cooperate so 01
The probabilities are:
The probabilities for Y are defined similarly except that ( )
, , ,
, and the stationary probability vector v is given by
The average of f for the Markov chain states is then given by 
( )
,, D pqf is obtained from the matrix M with the vector using a standard set of matrix and determinant properties and manipulations as described eloquently by Press and Dyson [8] . 
IV. Strategy Profiles Mapping onto Each Vertex of Stage Game
The vertices of the 2-dimensional representation of the stage game in Fig Table 1 summarizes these results for the infinitely degenerate vertex strategy sets.
Name
Strategy Sets Stage Game Vertex Mutual-Cooperation
( )
, PP 
V. Strategies Profiles Mapping onto Edges of the Stage Game
We consider a class of strategy profiles that map onto the four edges of the quadrilateral defined by Fig. 1 and shown as dashed lines in Fig. 2 . These are called edge strategy sets. The determinant in Eq. 3 depends linearly on components of the arbitrary vector f and, hence, on the payoff vectors X S and Y S when calculating scores using Eq. 4. In addition, two columns depend on the strategy set of just one player, X or Y. These key insights implied that it was possible to select   ; pq so that the 8-dimensional strategy profile mapped onto a line in the 2-dimensional payoff space or, in other words, established a linear correlation between scores. In this section, we introduce the concept of strategy parameter and parameter elimination to show that the strategy sets called ALLC, meaning the player always cooperates, and ALLD, meaning the player always defects, map onto edges of the quadrilateral of the PD stage game. These two strategy sets are of interest in applications of IPD [5, 6, 9, 11, 19] .
A. Edge I Strategy Profiles
Along Edge I, the score of X is always greater than that of Y except at the point (R,R). Y selects a fully cooperative strategy set ALLC, 
The general expressions for the scores based on Eq. 4 and 5 are ( ) ( )
where ( ) 13 1 pp
with limits, 0     . These expressions for the scores are two parametric equations in terms of the strategy parameter  which is dependent on the strategy set chosen by X. Eliminating the strategy parameter gives a linear relation between the scores, ( 
B. Edge II Strategy Profiles
Along Edge II, the score for X is again always greater than that for Y except at the point (P,P). If X plays the fully noncooperative strategy set, ALLD, where 
C. Edge IV Strategy Profiles
Along Edge IV, the score of Y is always greater than that of player X except at the point (R,R). The strategic situation for Y along Edge IV is symmetric to that of X along Edge I. Assume X selects a fully cooperative strategy set ALLC, 
, corresponding to Edge IV. The strategy profile   ALLC ; pq then maps onto Edge IV, including the vertices. There are no a priori assumptions regarding the strategy set for Y, except that it is a valid conditional probability vector.
D. Edge III Strategy Profiles
Along Edge III, the score for Y is again always greater than that for X except at the point (P,P). The analysis parallels that for Edge II. If Y plays the fully noncooperative strategy, ALLD, where The strategy sets ALLC and ALLD map onto edges including vertices of the PD stage game. This result is general and independent of the exact strategy set of the other player. Fig. 3 summarizes the conditions for play along the edges of the PD stage game. 
VI. Mapping onto Interior of Stage Game: TFT, RTFT, WSLS, RWSLS, and −Strategy
We leave the vertices and edges of the stage game and venture into the interior of the quadrilateral by selecting more general strategy profiles. A third random strategy set called the −strategy is defined by
where  is a rational number satisfying 01   . This strategy is Axelrod's RANDOM strategy when 12  = [3] . The −strategy provides a mechanism for nonlinear trajectories of scores in the interior of the stage game. The parameter  in the −strategy means that the player cooperates with a probability  and defects with 1  − . The value 12  = is considered a "coin-flipping" strategy set for a player who posits that unpredictability can result in an enhanced score or who has no rational model of the IPD but must compete. Since 
A. TFT and RTFT vs −Strategy
With the strategy profile, , ,
The scores are 
The scores are equal and trace out the line from ( ) 
The endpoint for 0  = again falls on Edge III. Fig. 4 summarizes these results. including the GTFT strategy set. We return to the issue of score orderings below. Although cases of TFT and ALLC result in straight lines, the other cases of  , for example GTFT, are quadratic in  and are curvilinear in Fig. 4 . Since the IPD is symmetric in XY  , similar results follow for the region where XY SS  . These lines are also shown in Fig. 4 . The dashed edges are not traced by a single strategy profile but are the endpoints for (infinitely many) lines and curves traced by the strategy profiles with constant  . The lines and curves in Fig. 4 and 5 cover the vertices, edges, and interior of the Prisoner's Dilemma stage game as the parameters range through the rational numbers from 0 to 1.
B. TFT vs General Y Strategy
With the general strategy profile where the two strategy parameters are given by ( ) 
C. WSLS and RWSLS vs −Strategy
With these strategy profiles,   RWSLS ;  pq , the determinant in Eq. 3 becomes
The scores are obtained from Eq. 7 as follows:
Then, the scores from Eq. 4 are The case 0  = gives the classic WSLS strategy set . This ordering of scores is discussed further in the next section with Y playing a general strategy set. The line for Y playing WSLS and X playing the −strategy is also shown. This line has endpoints on Edges II and IV and passes through the point of equal scores as shown in Fig. 6 . 
The parametric Eq. 12 and 13 are quadratic in the strategy parameter  so curvature is expected and clearly observed in Fig. 6 
D. WSLS vs General Strategy
With the strategy profile   WSLS ;
pq , the determinant in Eq. 3 becomes
The two strategy parameters are ( ) Varying the two strategy parameters generates an infinity of lines covering the area as indicated in If X chooses WSLS, then the Y strategy set determines the orderings (extortive, reciprocal, and altruistic) of the scores. Stated another way, Y choosing a strategy set that can be extortive, reciprocal, or altruistic is conditional on X choosing WSLS. Note here that there is no condition on 4 , the probability to defect after mutual defection. These results are consistent with those when X choses WSLS and Y choses the −strategy discussed in the previous section. More comments on this surprising result are in Section IX. Conclusions.
VII. DaMD Strategy Set vs -Strategy and WSLS. Reciprocity and Extortion
The DaMD strategy set is defined by DaMD = ( 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 = 0). For the strategy profile { DaMD , ℇ }, Eq. 3 gives
with two strategy parameters are defined as ( ) 
The strategy parameter  can be eliminated from the scores giving the linear relation,
where
When Y plays ALLD so that 0  = , then the scores map onto ( ) As  scans between its limits, the edges and interior of the quadrilateral are covered by the lines generated. The terms extortive and altruistic for Y playing WSLS rather than X are used in an opposite fashion to the previous section because here the strategy of player X determines the orderings of scores. The condition 23 1
for ensuring XY SS  , is a general property of DaMD not limited to Y playing an −strategy or WSLS. We show this in detail in the next Section.
VIII. DaMD vs Arbitrary Strategy
We let X play DaMD and Y play an arbitrary strategy. Eq. 3 gives 1 p = , 4 0 p = , 23 1 pp += Table 3 . DaMD strategies with generic, extortive, and reciprocal conditions.
IX. Conclusions
The general analysis presented here establishes many specific features of the mapping from the 8- SS . The concept of strategy parameter is key to this technique to identify the lines that are mapped by a strategy profile. Vertex strategy profiles are shown in Fig. 2 and Table 1 . Edge strategy profiles are described in Fig. 3 and Sec. V. These ALLC and ALLD are the key edge strategy sets with ALLC mapping onto Edges I and IV and ALLD mapping onto Edges II and III for any opponent strategy sets. In the specific example of Ref. 8 , the extortionate strategy set (ZDS) is played against an ALLC strategy so maps onto Edge I. This is readily seen by taking Eq. Dyson also showed how a player Y, whom they call "evolutionary" and who only acts to increase Y's own score without regard for the score of X, can be extorted if X plays the ZDS. We refer to the "evolutionary" player who only considers that player's own score as a "naïve" player. We return to this feature for DaMD below.
Several famous strategy profiles are shown to map onto lines in the interior of the PD stage game.
The -strategy is played against tit-for-tat (TFT) and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) as well as random versions of these two strategies (RTFT and RWSLS) as models. TFT and WSLS are also played against a general strategy set for Y. The scores for these games are expressed in terms of one or more strategy parameters which depend on a specific combination of the transition probabilities, p or q , appropriate to the strategy profiles. The strategy parameter(s) is then eliminated between the scores for both players resulting in a linear relation between the scores. This is done for mapping of the 8-dimensional hypercube of strategy profiles into the 2-dimensional space of scores including edges and the interior of the stage game. The specific expressions for scores give the endpoints of the line. Linear relations between scores are ubiquitous and are not specific to ZDS or DaMD. The scores for one player acting on the −strategy are quadratic in  so the trajectories of the scores obtained by varying the strategy parameter  show curvature as in Figs. 4 and 6 . The lines and curves give insight into the behavior of the scores as the strategy profiles are systematically varied. Recently human-machine experiments have verified predictions of the linear relations between scores [18, 20] . Our analysis gives many new predictions that can guide experiment and decision making.
It is important to be clear on the concept of a strategy set that can extort the other player. The first specific example with an extortive score condition in the present work came when X chose WSLS while Y chose an −strategy or a general strategy. The line for these strategy profiles passed through the interior of the stage game from the region where XY SS  because 23 which results in this score ordering. This ordering is extortive for Y. The strategic environment is subtle because these score orderings depend on X choosing WSLS. But the WSLS strategy set has a good performance in tournaments [6] . Since the scores XY SS  when X chooses WSLS means that the player Y strategy set with 23 + >1is responsible for good performance of WSLS, one possibility is that player X has prior information that opponents in a tournament are more likely to choose an altruistic strategy set with 23 + >1than to choose the extortive strategy set with 23 + <1[13, 22] . Another possibility is that the tournament conditions do not satisfy the conditions for Markov chain analysis. For example, fluctuations may play an important role in the limited repetitions of a human tournament. Fluctuations are beyond the scope of the analysis of the present work. Also Fig. 6 shows a region of no scores around (P,P) when WSLS is played. As a final remark, it is important to note that extortive scores for Y over X can exist when player X choses WSLS even without the condition of defection after mutual defection for Y ( 4 0 q = ).
The DaMD strategy has player (X) defecting after previous mutual defection ( 4 0 p = ). However, this property alone is not enough to ensure that X can extort the other player Y [23] . As we show above, the transition probabilities 2 p and 3 p are also crucialextortion and reciprocity using the DaMD strategy rest on a three-legged stool with the three legs being the conditional transition probabilities 2 p , 3 p , and 4 p . One leg of course is 4 0 p = . The other legs determine whether the scores are extortive ( 23 1 pp + so X Y SS  ) or reciprocal ( 23 1 pp += so X Y SS = ). These results depend on only the DaMD strategy of player X unless player Y also choses a DaMD.
It has been long understood that the Nash equilibrium strategy of a rational player is to defect in a single-play, stage game of Prisoner's Dilemma [13] . A relatively straight-forward argument building on that for the single-play stage game concludes that the equilibrium strategy of a rational player is to defect, certainly on the last play, of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game [22] . It has not been clear if such an equilibrium strategy for a rational player exits in the infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. The existence of the DaMD strategy provides an answer for the infinitely iterated PD: Two rational players in infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma must conclude that the other rational player choses an extortive DaMD so each player decides to play DaMD with 23 1 pp + resulting in stationary scores of ( ) , PP, equivalent to the result of mutual defection in the single-play stage game.
It has also long been known that cooperation is a hallmark of human and even some animal behaviors [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12] . Given the conclusion above that rational players must essentially play extortive DaMD in the IPD and take the ( ) , PP payoff, the question of how cooperation arises needs to be considered. This has been considered in the papers on ZDS in evolutionary dynamics already referenced [9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 20 ]. Our answer arises within DaMD itself and can lead even rational players out of the ( ) , PP state. We consider two rational players. Both players know that playing DaMD is a strategy set that can extort a naïve player, but also leads to low mutual scores ( ) , PP for two rational players. Instead these rational players can choose to initiate the Markov chain using the reciprocal DaMD with 1 1 p = , and 23 1 pp += for player X and the symmetric probability choices for player Y leading to the mutual Pareto optimal scores ( ) , RR . These are the best mutual scores for two rational players in the IPD. If this state is reached then, the two rational players can "go to lunch" and let a random number generator continue play, subject to the conditions of the reciprocal DaMD.
The other situation is that of a rational player vs a naïve player. The rational payer X can extort the naïve player Y by playing an DaMD. But X can be concerned that extortive scores are not stable if Y learns and becomes a rational player and detects that X has a larger score. Y will play the extortive DaMD and, when the Markov stationary state is reestablished, the scores are now ( ) , PP . However, X can choose to play a reciprocal DaMD that results in equal scores and so signal to Y. This is not necessarily altruism on the part of X, but perhaps foresight -Y eventually learns and becomes rational rather than remaining naïve. If the initially naïve Y is playing an strategy, for example, and learns to be rational, then Y can adjust  as in Fig.  and follows increasing scores to ( ) , RR. Such a path to cooperation has been suggested as a model for international affairs [21] . TFT is a classic DaMD strategy set with reciprocal probabilities since 23 1 pp += and X Y SS = . From the point of view of the present work, it is no accident that TFT performed so well in the initial two tournaments of Axelrod -TFT takes the road to cooperation and hence to the ( ) , RR state. The concepts of altruism [3, 4, 6] , reciprocity [3, 4, 6] , stability [3, 6, 22] , signaling [13, 22] , and learning [6, 22] have deep meaning in game theory. We use the dictionary definitions of these concepts to give a viable description of a path to cooperation that uses reciprocal DaMD as defined herein.
A naïve player always has a score lower than a rational player playing an extortive DaMD unless the naïve player choses an DaMD, perhaps by chance. As a final example, let X select the extortive DaMD given by ( ) 3 . Such a distance measure is related to the concept of frustration that is useful in landscape theory of complexity [19, 24, 25] and to potential games [22] . In Fig. 8 , we plot the scores and the distance measure for rational and naïve players starting at ( ) 1,1 so 0  = . The rational player plays the extortive DaMD above and the naïve player Y randomly increases  over 1000 Markov steps to increase Y's own score. Our discussion above suggests that such a relatively large distance of 2.5 and resulting frustration for scores at Markov step 1000 is not be stable if the naïve player learns, becomes rational, and plays an extortive DaMD. We described above a reciprocal strategy profile DaMD that leads to cooperation and the state ( ) , RR . Theoretical explanation of the path to cooperation may ultimately be based on detailed landscape dynamics [19, 24, 25] and fluctuations [25, 26, 27] . The present paper provides insight for the development of such a path.
